Abstract. In the absence of closed shops and discriminatory wage policies, union membership can be explained by the existence of social norms. We describe a model, incorporating institutional features of the German labour market, which explicitly allows for social custom effects in the determination of union membership. Using panel data for Germany, we find evidence for according effects which restrict freeriding. The impact of social norms tends to increase with net union density. Hence, observed reductions in the demand for union membership can weaken the impact of a norm and accentuate the free-rider problem.
INTRODUCTION
Why do people become members of a trade union if it is not mandatory but costly to be one? In general, all employees covered by collective bargaining agreements obtain the same wage and face the same working conditions, irrespective of their union status. In 2000, for example, approximately 63% of employees in West Germany and roughly 46% of their East Germany counterparts were covered by industry-wide collective bargaining agreements, while the respective figures for firm-specific agreements amounted to 7% in West Germany and 10% in East Germany (Kohaut and Schnabel, 2003) . In view of this high collective bargaining coverage, wages as well as working conditions set by collective agreements are an important benchmark due to a union deterrence effect (Franz and Fitzenberger, 1999; Kohaut and Schnabel, 2003) . Thus, free-riding on union activity seems to be a dominant strategy for employees (Olson, 1965) . This interpretation would be consistent with the remarkable decline in union density. In Germany, unions have lost more than 4 million members between 1991 and 2000, i.e. about 30% of their 1991 membership (cf. Ebbinghaus, 2003) . Figure 1 illustrates the development of union membership in Germany (including the eastern part from 1991 onwards) for different indicators of union density until 1997, the last year for which all according measures are available.
After a short upsurge in membership in the 1950s, density, irrespective of whether it includes or excludes unemployed in the denominator or nonworking members in the numerator, remained basically stable until the first oil price shock, then rose and fell off in the 1980s. Unification sharply increased union density, before the above-mentioned decline set in. One successful strategy for unions to counter the decrease in membership might be to stress their role as a movement that provides specific social values (Calmfors et al., 2001, pp. 132-134) . In Germany, unions have actually gone along these lines within the last few years emphasizing their particular importance for preserving 'social standards in a globalizing world'.
In this paper, we try to assess how successful a strategy of promoting 'social values' might be. Our central objective is to test whether social custom effects have an impact on individual decisions to join or leave a union and to Notes: Gross Union Density I: entire union membership as share of gainfully employed wage and salary earners (excluding unemployed). Gross Union Density II: entire union membership as share of dependent labour force (including unemployed). Net Union Density I (II): active membership as share of gainfully employed wage and salary earners (dependent labour force), where active members do not include students, conscripts and pensioners.
Source: Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000) , Tables 13 and 14 of CD-ROM for Germany.
disentangle the nature of these effects. We proceed as follows: in Section 2, we review the theoretical and empirical literature on norm-based trade union membership. In Section 3, we then sketch a theoretical model based on the institutional features of the German labour market which clarifies how social norms might affect the decision to join a union. The social custom element of this model is subsequently put to an empirical test using data from the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) for the period 1985-98. While previous analyses for Germany have focused on the probability of being a union member, this study represents, to the best of our knowledge, the first empirical investigation of the decision to join or leave a trade union. Moreover, the social custom explanation of union membership has not been explicitly looked at before. Subsequent to a brief description of the data and the variables in Section 4, we outline our empirical specification in Section 5. Section 6 contains empirical results. Conclusions are found in Section 7.
DETERMINATION OF UNION MEMBERSHIP: A REVIEW OF CONTRIBUTIONS
The hypothesis underlying our analysis is that the existence of a norm or social custom can help to solve the apparent free-rider puzzle of trade union membership. This notion goes back to Akerlof (1980) who looks at the impact of a social custom on wage determination, in order to explain persistent unemployment. 1 The idea was taken up by Booth (1985) to rationalize union membership in a setting with homogeneous agents. Social custom models of trade union membership with heterogeneous individuals have been presented by Booth and Chatterji (1993) , Corneo (1993 Corneo ( , 1995 , Naylor and Cripps (1993) , Naylor and Raaum (1993) and Goerke (1997) . Alternatively, Booth and Chatterji (1995) , Moreton (1998 Moreton ( , 1999 and Holmlund and Lundborg (1999) have assumed that the heterogeneity of individuals results from differential preferences over private goods. Accordingly, the various approaches can be differentiated with respect to the source of heterogeneity among individuals. Moreover, the scope of bargaining, the treatment of unemployed, and the objective of the analysis differ.
Turning to the source of heterogeneity, it has been assumed that trade union membership yields a reputational gain r which increases utility and varies across individuals. Reputation r due to membership has been defined as independent of union membership or density m (Corneo, 1993) , as the product of the individual-specific reputation effect d and union 1. Social custom approaches have, furthermore, been utilized to model labour supply (de Neubourg and Vendrik, 1994) , strikes (Naylor, 1989 (Naylor, , 1990 , tax evasion (Myles and Naylor, 1996) , work effort (Chang and Lai, 1999) , police corruption (Chang et al., 2000) , pre-marital sex (Cameron, 2001 ) and adherence to environmental regulations (Lai et al., 2003) .
Norm-Based Trade Union Membership: Evidence for Germany r Verein für Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2004 density m, 2 or as decreasing with density (Corneo, 1997) . As an alternative, trade unions have been assumed to provide private services solely to members, such as grievance procedures or improved job security (Booth and Chatterji, 1995; Moreton, 1998 Moreton, , 1999 Holmlund and Lundborg, 1999) . Since it is our objective to analyse the validity of the social custom model for Germany, we assume that heterogeneity of individuals is due to their differential attitudes towards a norm of union membership. Moreover, because the nature of the social custom effect is theoretically and empirically uncertain, we allow for a flexible relationship between, on the one hand, reputation r and, on the other hand, density m and the individual-specific reputation element d. Implicitly, the differential modelling approaches also make alternative assumptions with respect to the nature of the social custom effect. If reputation increases with density, the norm may be regarded as outcome-oriented since its impact is influenced by the result in terms of the behaviour of other individuals. All specifications, however, also involve an individual-specific element, which captures the importance of 'internal' norms, affecting individual behaviour for any societal outcome.
Turning to the scope of bargaining, virtually all contributions presume that solely wages are determined collectively and that union preferences are given by those of the median member. Only Corneo (1993 Corneo ( , 1995 and Lai et al. (2001) model efficient bargains. In the context of a median voter model, the question arises of how preferences over two items -wages and employmentare aggregated consistently. Corneo (1993 Corneo ( , 1995 circumvents this issue by assuming risk-neutral workers. In an efficient bargaining setting, this assumption entails no unemployment, such that union members effectively only have to vote over the union's wage preferences. Lai et al. (2001) presume that a union executive maximizes the sum of expected utilities of members, without recourse to a mechanism of preference aggregation.
Since workers decide about union membership prior to the determination of employment in all of the above models, some union members will be unemployed if firms determine employment along a labour demand curve. As a consequence, unemployed union members are usually assumed to leave the union and to be refunded their membership fees.
3 This assumption ensures that equilibrium union membership is determined by the employees' behaviour, but is in conflict with the available evidence for Germany. While union membership of unemployed may be a somewhat recent 2. See Booth (1985) , Booth and Chatterji (1993) , Corneo (1995) , Goerke (1997) and Lai et al. (2001) . A slightly more general specification is chosen by Naylor and Raaum (1993) (and Naylor and Cripps, 1993) who assume that the marginal gain from membership increases (does not fall) with the strength of the individual-specific reputation effect. Naylor and Cripps (1993) assume, in addition, that also non-membership represents a social custom which yields reputational gains for those who adhere to it. 3. An according assumption is, for example, made by Booth and Chatterji (1993, 1995) , Goerke (1997) , Moreton (1998 Moreton ( , 1999 and Lai et al. (2001) . Only Holmlund and Lundborg (1999) presume that unemployed workers remain union members.
phenomenon, in 1998 12.3% (30.7%) of all members of the metal workers' union, IG Metall, were unemployed in West (East) Germany. Data for other unions also suggest a substantial fraction of unemployed members. 4 Accordingly, our theoretical model allows for continued membership of unemployed workers. Focusing, lastly, on objectives, earlier contributions explore the functioning of the basic model, for example with respect to exogenous variables such as the alternative income, the membership fee, the social custom variable or demand shocks (Booth and Chatterji, 1993; Naylor and Cripps, 1993) . Later contributions concentrate on an empirical verification of the private good model (Booth and Chatterji, 1995) , management opposition to union formation (Corneo, 1993 (Corneo, , 1995 Naylor and Raaum, 1993) , employment consequences of tax changes (Goerke, 1997) , the joint determination of union membership and labour productivity (Moreton, 1998 (Moreton, , 1999 , the impact of the Gent system of unemployment insurance (Holmlund and Lundborg, 1999) and the consequences of a currency devaluation (Lai et al., 2001) .
While the relevant theoretical contributions all assume a social custom of trade union membership, the empirical evidence on the existence and impact of such norms is scarce. To the best of our knowledge, only four studies have explicitly investigated these issues so far: none of them covers Germany or uses a longitudinal panel data design to estimate the parameters of interest.
5 For Italy, Checchi and Corneo (2000) , using macro data, provide correlations of aggregated social custom effects and aggregated union membership, the norm being proxied by the percentage of leftist votes. However, using macro data they cannot test whether social norms have an impact on the individual decision to join or leave the union. Visser (2002) finds that the probability of joining a union goes along with a pro-union attitude, the perceived pro-union climate and the perceived union density, using two surveys of Dutch employees. For a cross-sectional dataset of British university employees, Ingham (1993 Ingham ( , 1995 estimates that the probability of union membership increases with the partner being a union member and perceived union density. Neither of these three studies can disentangle the impact of individual unobserved effects and the consequences of social norms on the decision to join or leave the Ebbinghaus (2003) , in 1984/85 the fraction of unemployed members in German unions for which data were available, ranged between 1% and 7.4%. 5. While there are other studies focusing on the determinants of being a union member in Germany, such as Lorenz and Wagner (1991) , Fitzenberger et al. (1999) , Beck and Fitzenberger (2003) and Wagner (2003a, 2003b) , neither investigates the validity of the social custom assumption systematically.
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DETERMINATION OF UNION MEMBERSHIP: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In this section, we provide an outline of the theoretical model which governs our empirical specification. Formal details are relegated to Appendix A. The complete theoretical model consists of, on the one hand, a mechanism which determines which employees become union members and, on the other hand, a system of wage determination. Since our study seeks to investigate the social custom theory of trade union membership, potential union members are assumed to trade off the cost of membership and the increase in reputation r owing to an adherence to the social custom. This tradeoff is influenced by the prevailing wage and the level of union density. Wages are the outcome of a Nash-bargain between the trade union and firm. The union's behaviour is governed by the median member. Since the identity of the median member and, hence, union preferences depend on union density, wages and membership are determined jointly in equilibrium. The timing of decisions is as follows: first, employees decide about union membership, rationally anticipating the (equilibrium) union density and wage level; second, wage determination takes place. On the basis of this wage, firms determine employment. Our theoretical framework differs from earlier contributions in two aspects: first, in line with current behaviour of German unemployed, we allow workers without jobs to remain union members; second, we do not impose a functional form on the reputation function a priori.
Following the earlier discussion, we distinguish three types of social custom effects in our model: (a) The benefits from union membership are an increasing function of union density. We might interpret this as an indication of conformist attitudes by employees. (b) Reputation is independent of the size of the union. This can be labelled unionism founded in sovereignty. (c) Additional reputation might be derived from being a union member while other workers do not belong to it. Such unions are based on elitist behaviour, to employ Corneo's (1997) terminology. The alternative assumptions can formally be captured by a general reputation function r i , which relates the utility from membership to characteristics of the individual i, the size of the union and a shift parameter R (Goerke, 2002 pp. 33-41) :
The parameter g i indicates the individual-specific element of the valuation of unions, where people with a high valuation of unions are characterized by a greater value of g. The parameter Z indicates whether union density m has an impact on the reputation from union membership; that is, whether the norm also involves an outcome-oriented component. A value of Z 5 0 indicates sovereignty. For Z40, a value of b 0 implies that reputation is unambiguously increasing with union density and according empirical evidence can be interpreted as an indication of conformity. The special case of linearity (Z 5 1) has usually been investigated. If b 5 1 and Z 4 0 hold, reputation will decline with union density for all but the initial union member, and according empirical results can be viewed as evidence of elitism.
Let the utility of a worker i be additively separable in the utility u from income and the utility derived from union membership r i . Since union members have to pay a wage-dependent membership fee in Germany, the income of an employed unionist consists of the wage w less the fee wg, and amounts to w(1 À g). The resulting utility is given by u(w(1 À g)), u( Á ) being strictly concave, u 0 40, u 00 o0. If, as is feasible in Germany, an unemployed worker chooses to remain in the union, he or she will receive reputational utility ar i , where 0 ao1, pay a minimal fee, which we normalize to zero, 6 and obtain unemployment benefits B, 0oBow. The probability that a worker is employed (unemployed), assuming a random draw from the population, is No1 (1 À N), where N describes aggregate employment and labour supply has been normalized to unity. In Germany, it is explicitly forbidden to discriminate against workers because of union membership. Accordingly, union members and non-unionists are paid the same wage. An employee will join the union if the expected gain Z from doing so is positive. For an individual i, Z i is defined by (see Appendix A):
6. This is a reasonable assumption with respect to German unions, as the information derived from the unions' statutes on membership fees for unemployed workers at Note that there are currently eight unions in the German trade union federation (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, DGB). Since the union of police officers primarily represents employees which can basically not be dismissed, we have not included this union in our compilation. If the membership fee of the unemployed were not normalized to zero, the basic features of the social custom model would not be altered, while the formal apparatus would increase substantially in complexity.
Norm-Based Trade Union Membership: Evidence for Germany r Verein für Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2004 With the probability N, a worker is employed and obtains the utility from the wage w less the membership fee wg, instead of the utility from the wage. Accordingly, the first term in equation (2) represents the utility loss owing to the monetary cost of union membership. The gain -the second term in (2) -is due to the reputation effect which a member receives either in full with the probability of employment N or as a fraction a of the maximum impact with the probability of unemployment 1 -N. A given individual i will be more likely to be a union member, the higher the individual-specific reputation effect g i or the greater the product g i m Z is. For b 0, union membership will also be more likely the higher union density is, if Z40 holds. A rise in wages has ambiguous consequences on the likelihood of membership.
In an equilibrium, wages and union density ensure that, first, there are no incentives to join or leave the union from an ex-ante perspective and, second, they are compatible with the outcome of a union-firm bargaining process. To illustrate this equilibrium, note that joining the union will no longer be advantageous if Z i 5 0. For any given level of the density m it is, therefore, possible to determine that wage w which makes the marginal member, that is the unionist with the lowest value of g, just indifferent between leaving the union and remaining in it. Parametrically varying the level of density m, a membership demand curve MD (Booth and Chatterji, 1995) can be derived in the wage-density space. The properties of the MD curve depend on the assumptions about r i and u( Á ) (see Appendix A). For elitist (sovereign) employees, b 5 1 and Z40 (Z 5 0) hold and the MD is upward sloping (cf. Figure 2 , where linearity has been assumed for simplicity). For conformist workers, b 0 and Z40 hold true and the MD is given by a convex parabola (see Figure 3 ). For a given density level, the marginal member will gain utility if the wage rises. Thus, points above (below) the MD imply that employees obtain an increase in utility by joining (leaving) the union, such that density rises (falls). Hence, only the upward-sloping section of the MD can be an equilibrium. A higher level of membership m requires workers with lower values of g to join the union. Accordingly, if employees are conformist, there will be a minimum density s (1 À b)Z/(Z þ 1), below which the union will not survive. This cannot be the case for elitist or sovereign workers (see Corneo, 1997) . The existence of a minimum density level entails potentially disastrous consequences for a trade union which is faced with an exogenous decline in union membership, for example owing to a shift in the sectoral composition of the economy. If employees do not free-ride on the benefits of union activity due to a social custom based on conformity, a reduction in membership can weaken this norm-based behaviour to such an extent that free-riding will become a dominant strategy and the union ceases to exist.
To close the model, a wage determination process is added to the membership demand mechanism. Applying the generalized Nash solution yields a wage-bargaining curve (WB) in the wage-density space (see Appendix A for the derivation). The intersection of the WB and the MD determines the equilibrium levels of wages and density. For elitist or sovereign employees (b 5 1 and Z40 or Z 5 0), the WB is positively sloped in the wage-density space since a rise in membership decreases the median member's gain from bargaining -he or she is characterized by a lower value of g -such that the negotiated wage has to rise. Assuming stability, the MD increases more Norm and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2004 strongly than the WB, as depicted in Figure 2 . 7 For conformist workers (b 0, Z40), the WB is downward sloping until union density m reaches a minimum level given by m 5 2s. Up to this point, reputation of the median member increases with density because the gain from adhering to the norm outweighs the decrease in the individual reputation effect such that the product of g and m becomes larger. Since a rise in density increases the union's gain from bargaining for mo2s, the Nash solution requires a lower wage. For m42s, the WB is positively sloped since the individual effect dominates the conformity element of reputation and a higher density reduces the median member's gain from bargaining. The wage has to rise. Stability again requires that the MD has a greater positive slope than the WB. Assuming there are no multiple equilibria, Figure 3 depicts a potential outcome.
DATA AND VARIABLES
The open-shop trade union model postulates that social norms have an impact on union membership decisions and that this influence can depend on interactions of individual attitudes and social norms in the reference group. To put our theoretical model to an empirical test, individual data are required with information on union membership and individual commitment to unionism. Our data stem from the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP), a nationally representative longitudinal dataset for Germany, first conducted in 1984 and extended to East Germany in 1990 (cf. Wagner et al., 1993; SOEP Group, 2001 ). It provides data on union membership for the years 1985, 1989, 1993 and 1998 for all available subsamples. 8 The panel structure of the data allows us to analyse individual decisions to join or to leave a union.
The crucial task of our empirical work is to find appropriate proxies for the individual-specific element of the valuation of unions g i . Ideally, we would measure individual predisposition based on experimental information about attitudes. However, such information is not available in our data. Since actual behaviour is strongly influenced by own political beliefs as well as by actions of family members (see Windolf and Haas, 1989, or Naylor and Cripps, 1993) , we hypothesize that such information can adequately approximate the individual-specific element of union valuation g i . In particular, we employ 7. The requirements for a stable equilibrium are derived by Goerke and Pannenberg (1998) , for example. 8. GSOEP first asked East Germans about their union membership status in 1990, just before German unification. Information collected at this stage may, thus, either relate to membership in the former East German Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (FDGB) or to branches of the then only West German Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB). Schnabel and Wagner (2003a) argue that most of the changes in union membership in East Germany for the period 1990 up to 1993 are due to the specific transition process. Moreover, we do not have data for the West German sample for 1990. Therefore, we decided to use the information for East German respondents only for 1993 and 1998. two types of social custom proxies: the first one relies on information about the occupational status of the respondent's father, when the respondent was young. The reason being that the early socialization process within the family is an important determinant of union membership. In particular, we exploit information on whether the respondent's father was self-employed, when the respondent was aged 15, since self-employed people tend to disapprove of union activities. The second social custom proxy is based on information about the political beliefs and preferences of the respondent. Our hypothesis is that if the respondent prefers a political party which sympathizes with or opposes trade unions, this will be a good indicator for g i . Facing the German political system, we conjecture that supporters of the Social Democrats (SPD) go along with the collective principles of unionism whereas partisans of the more conservative parties, that is the Christian Democrats (CDU) and Christian Social Union (CSU), tend to oppose political activities of unions.
9
In our theoretical model, the gains or losses from conforming with the social custom of union membership are modified by the individual valuation of the reputation from unionism g i m Z (equation (2)). Hence, we have to interact our social custom proxies with the respondent's relevant industryspecific net union density. Of course we also include the social custom proxies themselves into the regressions. Industry-specific net union densities, i.e. the ratio of employed union members to all employees in that industry, are calculated from the GSOEP data, since annual membership statistics provided by the unions do not differentiate by employment status.
10
Our empirical analysis covers all workers who work part or full time in the relevant year, are not self-employed and aged between 18 and 65. Moreover, due to identification issues explained below, we restrict ourselves to workers who switch industries between two subsequent waves with information on union membership. Besides social custom variables we exploit information on gross monthly income, firm size, tenure, experience and regions in our regression exercises. More details on the data can be found in Appendix B.
EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION
In our model, an employee will join a union if the expected gain from doing so is positive. Equation (2) is, therefore, the core of our empirical specification. Since equilibrium union density and wages are determined jointly in the theoretical model, we investigated in preliminary regressions, whether individual real wages are endogenous within our microeconometric framework. This was done by means of a simultaneous equation model with a 9. In preliminary random-effects probit regression models of being a union member at a certain point in time we observed significant positive (SPD), respectively negative (CDU/CSU), correlations between union membership status and political preferences in our data, as do other studies . 10. See also Fitzenberger et al. (1999) for a discussion of this point.
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11 Additionally, we tested for a non-linear effect of lagged net union density on reputation (cf. equation (1)), using our sample of workers who switch industries. Standard tests did not reject the hypothesis of linearity, implying Z 5 0 or Z 5 1. Given these findings, we employ a single-equation model of union membership, including linear effects of union density on reputation, and exploit the longitudinal structure of our panel data to identify the effects of social norms on decisions to join or leave a union.
The starting point of our empirical work is the following fixed-effects logit specification of the union membership (equation (2)):
where U ijt 5 1 (i: individual; j: industry; t: year) if the expected utility from joining the union Z i is positive and U ijt 5 0 otherwise,
are the social custom variables, X ijt is a vector of observable individual characteristics (including the social custom proxies themselves), a i is an individual fixed effect, which captures unobserved time-invariant individual characteristics, and k 1 , k 2 and b are (vectors of ) unknown parameters.
To yield consistent estimates of equation (3), we follow Chamberlain (1980) 12 in maximizing the conditional likelihood function L c :
In equation (4) the likelihood for each set of observations is conditioned on its specific P T t¼1 u ijt . Intuitively, the conditional distribution of U ij1 , . . . , U ijT , given P T t¼1 u ijt , is not informative for P T t¼1 u ijt 5 0 or P T t¼1 u ijt 5 T since in these cases the outcome is completely determined and the corresponding probability equals 1. Therefore, only observations with at least one change in union membership status contribute to the conditional likelihood function (4). In our empirical application we additionally require that respondents switch industries ( j, k) between subsequent waves. Empirically, this leads to the case of t 5 2 in our subsample of the GSOEP. Hence, we have to consider the following two probabilities:
11. Our result is in line with most evidence provided by Wagner (1990 Wagner ( , 1991 and but not with the findings by Lorenz and Wagner (1991) for the year 1985. All these studies also rely on the GSOEP. Note that Lorenz and Wagner (1991) use a yearly income measure that does not allow to disentangle the effects of hourly wages and hours of work. 12. See also Baltagi (2001, pp. 206-208) .
The corresponding conditional likelihood function is:
where d i 5 1 for the observed sequence (0, 1) and d i 5 0 for the sequence (1, 0). Equation (7) reveals that our empirical specification, which relies on industry movers who also switch union membership status, enables us to tackle the 'reflection problem' described by Manski (1993 Manski ( , 2000 . 13 Manski points out that it is often difficult to disentangle empirically whether individual decisions depend on the behaviour, attitudes or exogenous characteristics of the reference group (social effects 14 ) or whether individuals act in the same way because they face similar institutional environments (correlated effects). We deal with this problem in the following way. First, we identify the parameters of interest not only because the social custom variables change over time but also because we observe them for each individual for two different industries in the two periods, since we only analyse workers who switch industries. Nevertheless, one might argue that the observed change in individual union status (either join or leave the union) might be correlated with the industry-specific net union density in t 5 2, i.e. with the union density in the new industry four or five years afterwards. Therefore, we replace the industry-specific union density in t 5 2 with lagged union density. In terms of the empirical work, this implies 13. For similar strategies see Bertrand et al. (2000) and Ichino and Maggi (2000) . 14. Note that Manski (1993 Manski ( , 2000 furthermore distinguishes two types of social effects, i.e.
endogenous and contextual (exogenous) ones. The former effect occurs because individual behaviour varies systematically with the behaviour of the reference group, while the latter arises since individual behaviour depends on exogenous characteristics of the group like, for example, attitudes towards work. In our empirical work we cannot disentangle these two types of social effects.
r Verein für Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2004 that we explain changes in union membership status for industry movers by observed differences in industry-specific net union densities and their interaction with our social custom proxy in t 5 1. Hence, we argue that the decision to join or leave a union depends on the individual evaluation of the observed difference in the relevant industry-specific net union densities before the respondent actually moves to the new industry. Second, including individual fixed effects in our empirical specification allows us to control for unobserved time-invariant individual characteristics, such as internal norms or work motivation, which might lead to sorting into specific industries. Table 1 reports the estimated parameters of the conditional fixed-effects logit model (equation (7)) for three specifications employing different sets of social custom variables. Specification 1 (CFE-I) uses both social custom variables, while the other two specifications (CFE-II, CFE-III) contain only one of them. Considering the general specification with both social custom variables (column 1), the estimated parameter for net union density is significantly positive. Hence, a positive difference in net union densities between the industry of destination and the industry of origin before the respondent actually moves, increases the probability of joining the union in the new industry. Conversely, a negative difference in net union densities raises the probability of leaving the union. This indicates that reputation is increasing with union density. In terms of our theoretical model, the result implies Z 5 1 and bo0 and, therefore, points to conformity-based unionism. With respect to the social custom proxy 'father self-employed when the respondent was 15 years old', the estimated parameter for our proxy of g i m Z is significantly negative, i.e. for the subgroup of workers whose family background was influenced by the self-employment of the father, the reputation effect of union density is significantly lower. Note that we observe this effect controlling for the time-invariant main effect 'father was self-employed' itself, which is captured by our individual fixed effect.
RESULTS
15 Hence, our result demonstrates that it is important to allow for a flexible specification of the relationship between reputation and union density in theoretical models. Finally, given the existence of reputation effects, our findings are not consistent with an interpretation that solely economies of scale in the provision of private services by unions are at work (cf. Booth and Chatterji, 1995) . Since neither the interaction of the political party preference indicator with union density nor the main effects 'prefers Social Democrats', 15. Schnabel and Wagner (2003b) find in their cross-sectional analysis a positive correlation of a dummy 'father was blue-collar worker' and the probability of being a union member for the years 1980 and 1992. Norm-Based Trade Union Membership: Evidence for Germany r Verein für Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2004 respectively 'prefers Christian Democrats/Christian Social Union', are significantly different from zero, we do not find evidence that the reputation effect significantly varies between individuals with different political preferences, once we control for individual fixed effects.
The probability of joining (leaving) a union increases (decreases) with firm size, i.e. non-union workers who accept a job at a new firm with more employees are more likely to join the union. This is in line with other studies on the probability of being a union member for Germany (Lorenz and Wagner, 1991; Fitzenberger et al., 1999; Schnabel and Wagner, 2003b) . Moreover, we find a positive effect of tenure on the likelihood of joining a union. This suggests for our subsample of industry movers that work experience at the new job, for example in terms of peer pressure (cf. Naylor and Cripps, 1993) , also matters for decisions to join or leave the union.
The LR test statistic indicates that the set of estimated parameters is jointly significantly different from zero (Test_X). Moreover, we perform a Hausman-type test based on the difference between the conditional fixedeffects logit model and a standard logit model ignoring the fixed effects to check for time-invariant unobserved individual heterogeneity (Test_a i ; see Baltagi, 2001) . We can reject the null hypothesis of no individual fixed effects (w 2 (21) 5 37.14). Hence, we observe individual heterogeneity with respect to the union membership decision in our data, as assumed in the theoretical model.
One might argue that family background and political preferences of the respondents are correlated, e.g. respondents tend to prefer conservative parties when their father was self-employed, and that, therefore, the estimates of column 1 are plagued by multicollinearity. To verify this argument, we use two specifications of the conditional fixed-effects logit model where we employ only one social custom proxy at a time. The parameter estimates displayed in columns 2 and 3 (CFE-II, CFE-III, respectively) show that our results are robust.
As an additional check of robustness we employ a linear probability model with individual fixed effect (LPM_FE) and estimate a linear version of equation (2) using the sample of industry movers. This enables us to assess whether our results are sensitive to the fact that the conditional fixed-effects logit specification is restricted to industry movers who also change their union status while still controlling for time-invariant individual heterogeneity. Again, we replace the industry-specific net union density in t 5 2 with their lagged union density. Since t 5 2 for every person, the within-transformation of the linear fixed-effects model is equivalent to estimating the model in first differences. Hence, we identify our parameters by regressing first differences in union status on differences in net union densities and their individual evaluation at the point of origin for industry movers.
Columns 1 to 3 of Table 2 reveal that the estimated parameters change neither for net union density nor the individual evaluation of the reputation 
CONCLUSIONS
The central objective of this paper is to investigate the importance of social custom effects for individual union membership. Initially, we develop a model of endogenous union membership based on the institutional features of the German labour market. Our subsequent empirical analysis reveals that social custom effects play a crucial role for the individual decision to join or leave a union in Germany. In particular, we find for people who switch industries (from a to b) that an increase in the lagged difference in net union densities between the new sector (b) and the old sector (a) goes along with an increase in the probability of joining the union. This effect varies across respondents with different social background and points to conformity-based unionism, i.e. the individual willingness to join (or leave) a union increases (declines) with industry-specific net union densities.
Although trade unions in Germany obviously face the problem of workers taking a free-ride on their services, our results provide evidence in support of the hypothesis that social custom effects restrict such opportunistic behaviour. This lends support to the observed strategies of unions in Germany of stressing their role as a social movement promoting specific social values. However, the theoretical analysis shows that such a strategy can be riddled with difficulties. If sector-specific net union densities decline due to, for example, shifts in product demand, changes in the composition of the labour force, or the emergence of new, non-unionized firms, the conformitybased social custom effect may be weakened substantially and union density fall below its minimum level. A union strategy focusing on social values may in such a case not overcome but accentuate the free-rider problem. Whether recent union mergers in Germany are a rational response to the problem of minimum union densities is an open issue. On the one hand, one might argue that union mergers like Ver.di stabilize union density above a critical value and, therefore, preserve or re-enforce an existing social custom. On the other hand, union mergers have to unite different cultures and this might erode the social custom. Since large-scale union mergers in Germany are a recent phenomenon, the evaluation of these competing effects remains a challenge for future research.
16. Since the linear probability model is heteroscedastic, we also calculate heteroscedasticityconsistent standard errors (HCSE) along the lines suggested by Greene (2000, p. 579) . These HCSEs are smaller than the ones presented in Table 2 . 17. The same result holds when we estimate the parameters of the LPM_FE based on the subsample N 5 716 employed for the CFE estimates. Sufficient conditions for V w o0 are: (1) the labour demand curve is weakly concave (N ww 0), and (2) the sum of twice the labour demand elasticity and the ratio of labour cost to profits is positive (cf. Goerke and Pannenberg, 1998) . Moreover, for f u(w(1 À g)) À u(B) þ (1 À a)r h :
For a union of elitist or sovereign members V m 40, such that the WB is upward-sloping (see Figure 2 ). For conformists, characterized by b 0 and Z40, two cases can be distinguished. For mo2s, the WB is downward-sloping, as V m o0. For m42s, V m 40 (see Figure 3) . The specification in equations (2) and (A.3) implies that a worker decides about its membership prior to having knowledge about the employment status. Ex-post, i.e. after some workers have become unemployed, the incentives to be a member differ since the probabilities of obtaining a job play no role. This could give rise to adjustments in union membership. However, if jobs are allocated at random among the workforce, these membership dynamics would be of a short-run nature, not alter the longrun equilibrium union density and can, therefore, be ignored. The argument is the following. First, wages are determined on the basis of the membership level at the time of the bargain. If wages are then fixed, subsequent changes in union density will have no impact on wages and employment. Second, given the random determination of employment, all workers who might have found it favourable to reverse their decision subsequent to the last instance of wage determination, have an incentive to join the union again prior to the next bargain, which is not modelled here. Alternatively, it could be argued that workers are bound by their membership decision for the duration of a wage contract. 
APPENDIX B: DESCRIPTION AND MEANS OF SELECTED VARIABLES

